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Background
Imperial Russia absorbed many regions with distinctive cultures before the formation of the Soviet Union. From its original territory stretching in the northwest corner of the Eurasian plain, the kingdom that would become Russia was repeatedly attacked by steppe nomads, culminating in its subjugation by the Mongols in the thirteenth century. and work towards resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. 13 But Russia has increasingly retreated from democracy and bullied its neighbors through economic and political means. 14 Russia is well placed to supply an energy-hungry world. It has the second largest coal reserves in the world, and is not only the largest exporter of natural gas in the world; it is the dominant natural gas supplier to Europe as well as a major source its of oil. 16 Some countries are entirely or largely dependent upon Russian energy supplies, particularly countries in the Near Abroad. As such, Russia has some ability to dictate natural gas prices, as well as control over the availability of this critical resource.
This preeminence of energy resources is not lost on the Russian leadership. In 2003 the chief executive of UES, Russia's electric power company, argued that Russia should dominate neighboring countries through "economic occupation" by purchasing foreign debts and acquiring strategic economic assets in these countries. 17 Since laying out this plan, UES has purchased power companies in eight countries in the Near Moscow has also attempted to coordinate export policy with other natural gasproducing countries such as Algeria, evoking the specter of a cartel, or "gas OPEC." 19 While currently not making much progress in its development, such an association would give Russia even more economic leverage over Western Europe. Russia also hinted that the bulk of its energy exports could be provided to Asia or even the United Remittances from their nationals employed in Russia make up a large share of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of many of the nations of the Near Abroad. 21 This silent "export" to these countries also gives Moscow leverage over these countries if it threatens to stop immigration of deport their nationals in retaliation for a perceived slight or failure to toe the party line.
Russia's economic dominance over Europe poses problems in granting new NATO memberships to the nations of the Near Abroad, as well as raising questions as to the willingness to defend current recent members. Public opposition to EU enlargement and NATO expansion 22 leaves these countries in limbo. Current members such as the Baltic States would do well to understand that although the alliance is essentially a defensive one as outlined in Article V, the article stipulates that "member nations will take such actions they deem necessary to restore and maintain the integrity of the North Atlantic area." With the specter of crippling economic or energy sanctions looming over them, traditional NATO members might deem it in their best interests to not intervene on the side of Near Abroad members in the event of Russian aggression, leaving it up to the U.S. to come to their aid as outlined in the National Security Strategy. 23 While relations have been tense with the European Union in the recent past, Moscow has focused its efforts on building bilateral ties with countries within the EU in an attempt to exploit the un-unified structure of the West to its own advantage, 24 pursuing bilateral agreements with individual European nations in an attempt to splinter any unity in policy that could be directed against Russia by overarching organizations such as the EU or NATO.
Willingness to Use Force. The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 highlighted the extent Russia is willing to go to when exerting influence over its Near Abroad. Georgia, a country on the road to NATO membership, was a willing supporter of the mission in Afghanistan, supplying troops trained to NATO standards for use in the stabilization of that country. 25 The war with Russia that followed various provocative acts 26 was swift and decisive, and all the more embarrassing for the lack of tangible NATO or U.S.
support to Georgia, 27 Party" is an example of the influence that Moscow has through ethnic Russians in the Near Abroad, who can vote as a monolithic block during elections, and typically follow the Russian party line on issues regarding their country of residence. 33 In many countries Russia encourages both ethnic Russians as well as Russified peoples (the Russian-speaking population in the former Soviet Republics) to join political parties with a pro-Russian bent in order to build a political front that is amicable to Russian policies.
These parties are supported through diplomatic efforts, media support, and advice. 34 Such actions to exploit the democratic process run counter to the U.S.'s policy of promoting democracy and human rights abroad.
Worsening Situation in Russia. Despite the wealth that has flowed into the country with the export of its natural resources to the West, Russia has a variety of internal problems. The country faces a demographic crisis, with a negative growth rate and poor health indicators such as life expectancy and increasing disease rates due to an underfunded health care system. The economy is vulnerable to fluctuations in the price of oil and gas, and the country's dilapidated infrastructure, to include aged pipelines, limited highway network, and substandard airports hinders growth in this sector. Its government is riddled with corruption, and there is a growing government control of the most influential outlets of the free press, which tends to blunt criticism of the Russian government.
According to General Makarov in February 2010, the attempted professionalization and reform of the Armed Forces through a volunteer military has foundered, and the armed forces' deficiencies in training, command and control, equipment, and doctrine were revealed during the Russo-Georgian War. 35 Ethnic tensions in the North Caucasus have also led to terrorist bombings in major Russian cities. 36 These myriad issues may create two futures for Russia. In the first, Moscow attempts to distract its populace from these internal issues with adventures abroad, which can be used to reassure its people that their country's prestige is still intact.
Another scenario might be one in which Russia's worsening situation spreads instability through the region, including health hazards, criminality, arms, or fugitive fissile material. This would work to destabilize not only the Near Abroad, but also key U.S. With no clear opponent, the need for such a treaty was repeatedly questioned, with some suggesting that NATO was an anachronism of the Cold War. 39 Having won the war, many NATO nations cut back on defense spending, instead concentrating on the "soft" power that the peace dividend allowed them to project in the form of geo-economics. 40 The powerful pull of the Western economies allowed those countries formerly under Soviet domination to move into a Western orbit and away from a prostrate Russia struggling to manage the transition from a Communist-run statedirected economy to a free market democracy.
One way for these former communist countries in the Near Abroad to orient themselves westward was to join NATO, membership in which brought the nuclear shield and political safeguard of the United States from their former masters in Moscow. The National Security Strategy also states that the United States endeavors "to build a stable, substantive, multidimensional relationship with Russia, based on mutual interests. The United States has an interest in a strong, peaceful, and prosperous Russia that respects international norms." 46 The strategy calls for bilateral cooperation with Russia (termed one of the 21st century centers of influence in the world) but at the same time stresses that the United States "will support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia's neighbors." 47 Speaking of Russia's goals in regards to the Near Abroad, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said "What is driving Russia is a desire to exorcise past humiliation and dominate its Near Abroad." 48 This would seem to have been borne out when Vladimir Putin, on October 3, 2011, proposed the formation of a "Eurasian Union" that would give Moscow not only economic and financial domination over these states but also allow it to oversee the evolution of its neighbors in its Near
Abroad. 49 How the U.S. pursues the issue of NATO membership for this region has farreaching implications for America both domestically and internationally. between members who specialize in 'soft' humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting the 'hard' combat missions. Between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership-be they security guarantees or headquarters billets-but don't want to share the risks and costs.
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Unfortunately for those nations seeking protection against an increasingly aggressive Russia, the specialization of NATO in "soft" missions such as Secretary
Gates describes will do little to deter Moscow as it seeks to impose its will on the Near
Abroad. This trend and its implications have not been lost on some alliance members.
There is a fear that the focus on expeditionary operations has weakened the mutual 59 While all these indicators may not accurately portray the ability or the will of NATO to respond to a resurgent Russia's aggression toward its Near
Abroad, taken as a whole they might tempt decision-makers in Moscow to engage in such adventurism in an area traditionally considered within their sphere of influence without fear of serious repercussions. In October 2009 the Russian Federation Council authorized the use of troops abroad to protect its peacekeepers and citizens and prevent piracy. 60 Such a law may be a veiled threat to its Near Abroad that Moscow is willing to use force in any situations when it deems it necessary around its periphery, especially if it cites a "right to protect" precedent in doing so.
Conclusion
The proposal of the formation of a "Eurasian Union" consisting of several postSoviet states by Vladimir Putin in October 2011 is only the latest manifestation of Russian attempts to increase its hold over the Near Abroad. 61 While it is difficult to determine the long term goal of Moscow, the almost certain re-election of Vladimir Putin to the Presidency in March 2012 will most-assuredly mean a more aggressive foreign policy as he attempts to turn his public's attention from the daunting list of internal domestic issues that Russia faces. This mounting pressure on the Near Abroad will make it increasingly likely that NATO will be forced to make difficult decisions regarding both the offer of new alliance memberships for these countries, as well as the lengths to which it will go to honor its Article V obligations in the event of a Russian attack (conventional or cyber) on current members on Moscow's borders. The growing economic and energy dominance that Russia exerts over the countries of Western and
Central Europe, as well as the decreasing defense expenditures and capabilities of NATO's European members, will certainly factor into any decisions made to defend small countries peripheral to Europe that only recently threw off the yoke of Russian hegemony.
Europe, and by extension NATO, must come to the realization that Russian policy towards its Near Abroad for the foreseeable future will be one of increasingly aggressive acts aimed at bringing these areas back into Moscow's sphere of influence, whether they are current members of NATO or not. The alliance must therefore decide how it will manage this attitude in an environment where Russia holds economic, 
